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DISCUSSION OF -RECENT DECISIONS

Regardless of the merits of these suggestions, it is clear that while
the standard in the New York Times case of knowing or reckless falsehood
may be reasonable when dealing with public officials, such a requirement,
which is tantamount to a finding of malice, is clearly too severe to apply
to persons who are the involuntary subjects of public interest. Often such
individuals, as the plaintiff here, already have suffered greatly from circumstances which gave them prominence in the public eye and, therefore,
should not be exposed to additional invasions of their privacy by false
reports of their tribulations without a suitable means of redress.
Private citizens, as Judge Cooley observed in 1888, have "the right
to be let alone"'2 and that right should not be jeopardized by a standard
which equates the rights of privacy of one who seeks the public spotlight
with one who purposely walks in its shadow.
RICHARD A. BRAUN

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-SELF-INCRIMINATION-REFUSAL

OF

ATTORNEY

TO PRODUCE DEMANDED FINANCIAL RECORDS AND TO TESTIFY IN A DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING

ON GROUND THAT THE RECORDS

AND TESTIMONY WOULD

TEND TO INCRIMINATE HIM NOT GROUND FOR DISBARMENT.-In

the case of

Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. -,
87 Sup. Ct. 625 (1967), the United States
Supreme Court was asked to decide whether an attorney's refusal to produce
demanded financial records and to testify in a disciplinary proceeding on
the basis that the records and his testimony would tend to incriminate him
was ground for disbarment. The Court held that the self-incrimination
clause of the fifth amendment had been absorbed in the fourteenth and
protects lawyers as well as other individuals and could not be watered
down by imposing disbarment as a price for asserting it.
The case arose out of a proceeding to discipline the petitioner, a
member of the New York Bar, for professional misconduct. Of the various
charges made against him, the one surviving was his refusal to honor a
subpoena duces tecum demanding that he produce certain financial records
pertaining to cases involving contingent fee compensation which, under a
New York Court Rule,' he was under a duty to preserve. Not only did the
23 Cooley, Torts 29 (2d ed. 1888).
1 Rule IV(6) of the Rules of the Appellate Division, Second Department of the Supreme Court of New York states:

Attorneys for both plaintiff and defendant in the case of any such claim or
,cause of action [claims or actions for personal injuries, property damage, wrongful death, loss of services resulting from personal injuries and claims in connection with condemnation 'or change of grade proceedings] shall preserve, for a
period of at least five years after any settlement or satisfaction of the claim
or cause of action or any judgment thereon or after the dismissal or discontihuance of any action, the pleadings -and other papers pertaining to such claim or
cause of action, including, but not limited to, letters br other data-relating to the
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petitioner refuse to surrender the demanded records, but he also refused
to testify at the judicial inquiry. His sole defense was that the production
of the records and his testimony would tend to incriminate him. The
Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court ordered the petitioner
disbarred, holding that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination was no defense under the holding of the United States Supreme Court
in Cohen v. Hurley.2 The Court of Appeals affirmed, and the case then
came before the United States Supreme Court by writ of certiorari.
In the Cohen case, the petitioner had been called to answer material
questions of a duly authorized investigating authority relating to alleged
professional misconduct as to members of the New York Bar. Cohen, like the
petitioner in the instant case, had been requested to produce certain records
and to answer the inquiries. He also refused to acquiesce to the demands,
invoking the privilege against self-incrimination, and was subsequently
disbarred. Cohen argued that the fourteenth amendment gave him a federal constitutional right not to be required to incriminate himself in the
state proceeding. The Court rejected this argument on the basis of the holding of Twining v. New Jersey,3 rendered fifty-three years before. A second
argument propounded by Cohen was that his disbarment, resulting from
his assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination, gave rise to a doctrine whereby lawyers are separated into a special group upon whom special
burdens could be imposed. In rejecting this argument, the Court stated:
We do not hold that lawyers, because of their special status in
society, can therefore be deprived of constitutional rights assured
to others, but only, as in all cases of this kind, that what procedures
are fair, what state process is constitutionally due, what distinctions
are consistent with the right to equal protection, all depend upon
the particular situation presented . ..

.4

In 1964, in the case of Malloy v. Hogan,5 the Supreme Court was once
again faced with the proposition that the self-incrimination clause of the
fifth amendment was applicable to the states by reason of the fourteenth.
In that case the petitioner, a witness in a state inquiry into certain crimes,
refused to answer certain questions by invoking the privilege against selfincrimination. In reversing his conviction for contempt, the Supreme Court
said:
The Fourteenth Amendment secures against state invasion the
same privilege that the Fifth Amendment guarantees against fedclaim of the loss of time from employment or loss of income, medical reports,
medical bills, x-ray reports, x-ray bills, repair bills, estimates of repairs, all
correspondence concerning the claim or cause of action, and memoranda of the
disposition thereof as well as canceled vouchers, receipts and memoranda evidencing the amounts disbursed by the attorney to the client and others in
connection with the aforesaid claim or cause of action.
2

366 U.S. 117, 81 Sup. Ct. 954 (1961).

3
4
5

211 U.S. 78, 29 Sup. Ct. 14 (1908).
Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 129-30, 81 Sup. Ct. 954, 962 (1961).
378 U.S. 1, 84 Sup. Ct. 1489 (1964).
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eral infringement-the right of a person to remain silent unless
he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and
to suffer no penalty . . . for such silence. 6
While the Malloy holding is obviously contrary to that of the Cohen
case, the Appellate Division in Spevack v. Klein 7 distinguished Malloy on
the ground that there the petitioner was not a member of the Bar. It should
be noted that in the Malloy case, the Court did not distinguish the Cohen
case nor expressly overrule it. The Court in Spevack, noting this fact, stated:
"While Cohen v. Hurley was not overruled [by Malloy], the majority indicated that the principle on which it rested had been seriously eroded." 8
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed Spevack's disbarment on the
authority of the Cohen case and on the ground that the fifth amendment
privilege did not apply to a demand that an attorney produce records required by law to be kept by him.
Since the facts of the Cohen case were substantially the same as those
of Spevack, the Court had to either affirm the holding by affirming petitioner's disbarment or overrule it. The Court chose the latter course:
We conclude that Cohen v. Hurley should be overruled, that the
Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment has been absorbed in the Fourteenth, that it extends its protection to lawyers
as well as to other individuals, and that it should not be watered
down by imposing the dishonor of disbarment and the deprivation
of a livelihood as a price for asserting it. 9
In a separate concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Fortas agreed with the
overruling of the Cohen decision but distinguished between a lawyer's
right to remain silent and that of a public employee who is asked specific
questions relating to the performance of his official duties.' 0 He stated that
a lawyer is not an employee of the state and does not have the responsibility
of an employee to account to the state for his actions because he does
not perform them as agent of the state.
The dissenting opinion written by Mr. Justice Harlan, in which Justices
Clark and Stewart concurred, emphasized that the issue was not whether
lawyers may enjoy first-class citizenship or whether lawyers may be deprived
6 Id. at 8, 84 Sup. Ct. at 1493.
7 385 U.S. 8 Id. at -,
9 Id. at -,

, 87 Sup. Ct. 625 (1967).
87 Sup. Ct. at 627.
87 Sup. Ct. at 627.

10 The reference here is to Garrity v. State of New Jersey, 385 U.S. , 87 Sup.
Ct. 616 (1967), decided the same day as Spevack in which the Court reversed the convictions of police officers charged with conspiracy to obstruct justice holding that where
the police officers were given a choice either to incriminate themselves or to forfeit
their jobs under a New Jersey statute dealing with forfeiture of office or employment
tenure and pension rights of persons refusing to testify on the ground of self-incrimination, the confessions wliich the officers chose to make were not voluntary but were coerced
and the fourteenth amendment prohibited their subsequent use. in a criminal prosecution
: .:
in a state court.
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of their federal privilege against self-incrimination but whether the petitioner's disbarment for his failure to provide information relevant to
charges of professional misconduct vitiated the, protection afforded by the
privilege. The minority stated that since the Constitution contains no standard by which the full scope of the privilege against self-incrimination can
be ascertained, the Court has been obliged to fashion standards for the
application of the privilege. "In federal cases stemming from Fifth Amendment claims, the Court has chiefly derived its standards from consideration
of two factors: the history and purposes of the privilege, and the character
and urgency of the other public interests involved."1 Recognizing the
state's authority to devise both requirements for admission and standards of
practice for those wishing to enter the professions, the minority concluded
that the rules of the New York Court requiring attorneys to actively assist
the courts and appropriate professional groups in the prevention and detection of unethical legal activities and to keep various records in certain
kinds of cases 12 were intended to protect the public and could not be said
to be unreasonable, arbitrary or unrelated to an attorney's continued fitness
to practice.
The minority also pointed out that because the petitioner may lose
his status as a lawyer by invoking the privilege against self-incrimination,
this in itself is not an impermissible infringement on the protection offered
by the privilege. "The Court has repeatedly recognized that it is permissible
to deny a status or authority to a claimant of the privilege against selfincrimination if his claim has prevented full assessment of his qualifications
for the status of authority."' 3 Finally, the minority concluded:
The petitioner was not denied his privilege against self-incrimination, nor was he penalized for its use; he was denied his authority
to practice law within the State of New York by reason of his failure to satisfy valid obligations imposed by the State as a condition
of that authority. The only hazard in this process to the integrity
of the privilege is the possibility that it might induce involuntary
disclosures of incriminating materials; the sanction precisely calculated to eliminate that hazard is to exclude the use by prosecut14
ing authorities of such materials and of their fruits.

In a separate opinion in which Mr. Justice White dissented to the
holdings of the majority in both Garrity v. State of New Jersey1" and

Spevack, he stated that the petitioner was properly disbarred because the
inquiry was about the performance of his public duty and he was therefore obliged to disclose all pertinent information.
The holding in the Spevack case appears to have enlarged the scope of
11 Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S.
12 Supra note 1.
13 Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S.
14 Id. at , 87 Sup. Ct. at 635.
15 Supra note 10.

, 87 Sup. Ct. 625, 632 (1967).
87 Sup. Ct. 625, 633-4 (1967).
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protection provided by the self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment
to include lawyers who assert it in state disciplinary proceedings. However, from the very outset there was never any question as to the petitioner's
right to invoke the privilege; and even though he was neither indicted nor
convicted of a crime because he invoked the privilege, the majority stated
that a person has the right to remain silent and to suffer no penalty for
the silence and that "penalty" is not restricted to a fine or imprisonment
but means the imposition of any sanction which makes the assertion of the
fifth amendment privilege costly. 16 The only conclusion which the Court
could draw from this premise was that the petitioner's disbarment and
resulting loss of professional standing and livelihood because of the assertion of the privilege was indeed costly and could not be sustained.
While there can be no question that what the petitioner stood to lose
as a result of his invoking the fifth amendment privilege made its assertion
costly, the fact that the petitioner was a lawyer whose professional conduct
was under scrutiny makes the majority's holding difficult to reconcile. This
is especially true when one acknowledges the state's power to regulate
the admission of attorneys to the bar and the standards of practice of the
legal profession. The lawyer is under a duty, be it because of rules imposed
by the highest court of the state in which he practices or because of the
standards of conduct imposed by the profession itself, to see that the
trust which the public places in him as an officer of the court is not violated.
Was what the petitioner was asked to do in the instant case nothing more
than what he was under a duty to do? He was asked to produce records
which the state court had required him to keep and to cooperate in investigating alleged professional misconduct, and as the minority opinion stated:
These rules are intended to protect the public from the abuses revealed by a lengthy series of investigations of malpractices . ...
It cannot be said that these conditions are arbitrary or unreasonable, or that17 they are unrelated to an attorney's continued fitness
to practice.
In view of all the circumstances, it appears that the question becomes
one of whether the petitioner had the right to remain silent; and by weighing the public good against the disadvantage at which he was placed as a
result of the inquiry into his professional conduct, the answer to the question posed would have to be negative.
WILLIAM L. GREENE
16 Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 17 Id. at , 87 Sup. Ct. at 633.

-

,

, 87 Sup. Ct. 625, 628 (1967).

